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As the tumultuous year of 2010 draws to a close, 
the euro-area economy presents itself in a 
complex state marked by a certain ambivalence 
of fortunes. While great achievements have been 
made and considerable challenges remain, one of 
the most welcome developments has been the 
strength of the economic recovery this year. The 
Commission's latest Autumn Forecast, published 
on 29 November 2010, showed a significant 
upward revision to euro-area GDP growth, 
which is expected to reach 1¾% for 2010 as a 
whole.  
This encouraging headline figure cannot do full 
justice to the complex economic forces currently 
shaping the recovery and the balance of risks. 
Signs of a softening global environment and the 
onset of fiscal consolidation entail that activity is 
likely to moderate towards the end of 2010 and 
in 2011, but to pick up again in 2012 on the back 
of strengthening private demand. The recovery 
also appears to be broadening out. While export 
growth has been solid for some time, the euro-
area economy is now entering the next phase, 
whereby the pick-up in exports starts to spur 
investment demand, especially for equipment. 
Some improvement is also apparent in national 
public finances as virtually all Member States' 
deficit is falling in 2011, although debt levels are 
still trending upwards. 
Divergences still lie at the heart of euro area 
problems 
The robust expansion of output this year should 
be taken as a clear sign of the recovery taking a 
lasting hold. At the same time, however, the 
divergence of economic performance and 
prospects across Member States of the euro area 
is a reflection of the still-sizeable adjustment 
needs of some economies. The strength of the 
sovereign debt crisis that shook the euro area 
this year underlined that fiscal consolidation 
needs to remain a top priority, although it will 
not be sufficient in itself to correct a number of 
important macroeconomic imbalances in some 
of our economies. 
The banking sector in the euro area and beyond 
has continued to both emit and indirectly 
transmit risks to financial stability and real 
economic activity. Countries with large banking 
sectors and/or with strong cyclical asset price 
fluctuations have been cast into the spotlight 
once again this year, as private sector balance 
sheet problems coupled with sizeable 
refinancing requirements in the banking sector 
sat uncomfortably with the sometimes fickle risk 
tolerance of financial markets. 
Divergent current account trends in previous 
years have been a reflection of a fundamental 
unevenness of relative domestic demand strength 
across the euro area. The task of rebalancing the 
economies burdened by high external deficits 
and/or debts is as challenging as it is necessary. 
Despite the ongoing adjustment, significant 
imbalances remain in place. Prices in some 
countries have yet to follow the reduction in 
domestic demand so that their price 
competitiveness materially improves.  
Ireland's recent wide-ranging economic 
programme exemplifies a comprehensive 
approach to a number of these challenges. Its 
key objective is the restoration of financial 
market confidence in the economy's banking 
sector and public finances. By supporting the 
process of downsizing and deleveraging in the 
Irish financial sector and by helping to 
recapitalise the banking system, the programme 
can help break the pernicious feedback loops 
between the fiscal and financial sector. Coupled 
with credible measures to rebalance public 
sector spending and revenue and to structurally 
support the redeployment of productive 
resources, the programme should thereby enable 
the economy to return to sustainable growth.  
Notable achievements in the face of turmoil 
The sovereign debt crisis this year has illustrated 
the kind of difficulties that can arise from 
unbalanced growth patterns, including from 
fiscal, external and financial sector imbalances. 
Yet, for all the challenges that we face in the 
coming years across the euro area, the ensuing 
policy response has been effective in containing 
the associated risks of contagion and has set in 
train a fundamental overhaul of economic 
governance in the euro area and EU. Decisive 
strides forward have further been made in the 
areas of financial stability and supervision. I am 
proud of the way the EU as a whole has pulled 
together to deliver novel and far-reaching 
solutions to the various challenges. Amongst the 
major achievements this year I would count the 
financial support programmes for Greece and 
Ireland, the creation of the European Financial 
Stability Mechanism (EFSM) and the European 
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Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), as well as 
the decisive extension of the ECB's lending 
operations. All these steps were essential to 
ensure the financial stability of the euro area and 
the EU as a whole.  
Together, we have also helped overhaul financial 
sector supervision with the creation of new 
regulatory bodies and have set up the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which will go a 
long way in building a more stable and safer 
financial system in the EU. The Commission has 
also played a leading part in developing a 
comprehensive set of proposals to overhaul 
economic governance in the EU with a view to 
strengthen fiscal surveillance and to address 
other forms of macroeconomic imbalances. We 
have taken steps to boost our economic growth 
potential through the Europe2020 strategy and 
laid out the key principles of an EU framework 
for crisis management in the financial sector. 
Taken together, these achievements leave no 
doubt that Europe has the resolve to do what it 
takes to protect the stability and integrity of its 
economies. 2011 will undoubtedly again bring 
challenges both old and new for the euro area, 
but we will meet them with the same resolve as 
this year. 
Focus on financial regulation and financial 
markets in the euro area 
In keeping with the prominent role occupied by 
financial marked issues in recent months, this 
edition of the Quarterly Report on the Euro Area 
features analysis of a number of closely related 
topics in this area.  
The Focus Section starts with the observation 
that excessive credit and asset price bubbles in 
the euro area were an important cause of 
overleveraging in the private sector, and that the 
financial crisis has exposed the limits of the 
current regulatory and supervisory structure in 
dealing with the build-up of balance sheet 
vulnerabilities in the banking sector. Within the 
euro area, addressing asset price bubbles 
requires monitoring and pre-emptive action and 
thus the supervisory toolbox should be 
considered as part of a wider macro-prudential 
surveillance framework.  
Turning to the set of special topics in this issue, 
we examine the impact of the financial crisis on 
the euro-area banking sector, in particular on 
cross-border integration of financial institutions 
through bank mergers and acquisitions (M&A). 
The results show that the process of market 
integration is still ongoing, although at a slower 
pace as a consequence of the crisis and of the 
ensuing restructuring of the banking sector. 
Furthermore, the process of market integration is 
not uniform across countries, with smaller 
economies becoming internationally integrated 
more quickly than larger ones, for which M&A 
activity is predominantly domestic. Irrespective 
of country size however, the crisis has led to a 
clear slowdown of M&A activity and a 
refocusing on domestic activities for almost all 
euro-area countries. 
This edition further investigates the effects of the 
sovereign debt crisis on the recovery process in 
the euro-area financial sector. The deterioration 
of investors' perception of sovereign risk has 
contributed to a negative feedback loop between 
public finances and financial market 
developments. It has raised funding costs for 
banks in the peripheral Member States and has 
complicated the process of banks' balance sheet 
repair. The emergence of some sovereign bonds 
as risky assets has segmented the investor basis 
and led to higher funding costs for some 
sovereigns, despite falling benchmark interest 
rates. This illustrates that the recovery in the 
financial system is even more dependent on the 
strength of economic recovery than before. 
Finally, this issue shows that the euro-area 
corporate sector's traditional reliance on bank 
lending (rather than capital markets) may be 
changing. The surge in bond issuance by non-
financial corporations in 2009 and the 
persistently high share of bonds in corporations' 
external funding in 2010 suggest that the euro-
area corporate sector may have responded to the 
financial crisis and the tightening of bank credit 
conditions by diversifying its sources of external 
funding. If persistent, this diversification process 
would make part of the euro-area corporate 
sector – mostly large companies – less reliant on 
banks. 
I wish you all a good and happy start to the New 
Year, which will I am sure be more successful 
than it will be taxing. 
 
MARCO BUTI 
DIRECTOR-GENERAL 
Focus 
I. Regulatory changes in the financial sector and the  
prevention of housing bubbles 
 
- 7 -
I.1. Introduction 
Housing market developments, including its 
financing, lie at the heart of the recent global 
financial crisis. House price dynamics associated 
with the development of new, complex financial 
products have facilitated the build-up of risks, 
eventually threatening the very foundation of the 
banking system. More generally, house price 
bubbles can be thought of as the excessive 
movements of prices that cannot be explained on 
the basis of fundamentals. They tend to occur in 
cycles covering a variety of asset prices 
accompanied by ample global liquidity and have 
potentially serious fallouts for the real economy. 
Besides factors influencing the supply of 
mortgage loans, demand for housing loans is 
determined by a number of factors both structural 
and market-oriented. (1)  
Asset price bubbles are difficult to identify in 
their build-up period. Given their social and 
economic cost, however, there is an emerging 
consensus on the need to design policy 
frameworks that can reduce their occurrence and 
mitigate their effects. (2) There is scope for 
monetary policy to pay greater attention to 
financial risk and credit developments, i.e. “lean 
against the wind”. (3) However, monetary 
                                                        
(1) These determinants include long-term structural demographic 
developments, income, supply-side housing construction, 
consumer and investor preferences, the price of substitutes, 
fiscal regimes, developments in rental markets, as well as the 
availability of funding.  
(2) See for instance IMF (2010), Rethinking macroeconomic 
policy’, IMF Staff Position Note (February). 
(3) See for instance ECB (2010), ‘Asset price bubbles and 
monetary policy revisited’, Monthly Bulletin (November). 
instruments are relatively blunt and best geared to 
influencing economic activity and inflation rather 
than addressing particular vulnerabilities in the 
financial sector. (4) This means that additional 
policy instruments are required to tackle excessive 
credit and asset price bubbles. The issue is 
particularly crucial for the euro area, where 
monetary instruments are not targeted at the needs 
of individual Member States and in particular at 
possible regional asset price bubbles.  
To that end, the EU is equipping itself with a 
range of instruments. Macroeconomic 
surveillance will be expanded beyond fiscal 
policy to include an Excessive Imbalance 
Procedure to addressing macroeconomic 
imbalances at an early stage. (5) Regarding the 
financial sector, the European Systemic Risk 
Board will be charged with macro-prudential 
oversight and issue warnings and policy 
recommendations to address systemic risks. 
Against this background, the present focus section 
looks at the role that regulatory and supervisory 
tools may play in preventing excessive credit 
growth and housing bubbles. The overarching 
goal of prudential measures is to improve the 
resilience of the financial system by ensuring that 
banks' risk management practices are not a source 
of systemic risk. As shown in the recent past, 
house price bubbles can form a vicious circle 
                                                        
(4) IMF (2010), ‘Central banking lessons from the crisis’, IMF 
Policy Paper (May). 
(5) European Commission (2010), 'Proposal for a regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention 
and correction of macroeconomic imbalance', COM(2010) 
527 Final, 29.09.2010. 
Developments in the housing market and its related financial products have been at the heart of the current 
financial crisis, prompting a debate on ways to limit excessive credit growth and housing bubbles. Recent 
developments in lending for house purchases in the euro area evidence a variety of regional profiles — certain 
markets demonstrated much stronger growth than others in pre-crisis years, on the heels of brimming demand 
for housing. The single monetary policy appears ill-suited to address the adverse effects of excessive credit 
growth with a strong regional dimension. In contrast, regulatory and supervisory tools could prove more 
effective in limiting the occurrence and magnitude of housing price bubbles by keeping banks’ leverage in 
check and by imposing higher standards on bank lending. They could also indirectly help curb the pro-
cyclicality of bank lending and mitigate the risks of cross-border spillovers. In this respect, the newly created 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) will play a pivotal role for the identification of risks to the stability of 
the financial system as a whole. 
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leading to inadequate risk management, distorting 
liquidity and funding management, and resulting 
in excessive credit growth, with potentially 
inflationary pressures. In this context, prudential 
measures could send clear signals to direct banks’ 
behaviour and influence market incentives 
towards moderating balance sheet expansion, 
thereby ultimately containing imbalances and the 
potential cost of cyclical downturns. As prudential 
regulation is by definition pre-emptive, it could 
help avoid vulnerabilities at an early stage, and 
target regional or institution-specific risks. With 
banks playing a dominant role in the euro area, 
constraining banking credit via prudential tools 
could materially contribute to the moderation of 
regional asset price increases, thereby helping to 
limit the pro-cyclicality of the financial sector. 
I.2. Credit cycles and housing bubbles in 
the euro area 
Several episodes of asset price bubbles can be 
identified (ex post) in the euro area. On key 
consequence of bursting bubbles is a fall in 
households' net housing wealth, as occurred 
during the recent financial crisis (Graph I.1). 
Graph I.1: Housing loans and housing wealth, 
euro-area households (2007-2010Q2, end of 
period stocks, EUR bn) 
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Source: ECB, Commission services. 
Euro-area countries display divergent and 
segmented housing and mortgage markets, 
reflecting regional specificities in terms of market 
size, competition, developments in rental markets, 
legal, taxation and regulatory frameworks, as well 
as financing conditions. Data on loans to 
households for house purchases provide some 
evidence of episodes of excessive credit growth 
and asset price bubbles in pre-crisis years in some 
parts of the euro area. (6) In some Member States, 
markets experienced buoyant developments — in 
Ireland, Greece, and Spain; to a lesser extent in 
Italy and Luxembourg (see Graph I.3 and I.4). In 
other Member States, credit growth was more 
modest — Germany, Austria, Finland and 
Portugal. Some of the Member states that have 
recently adopted the euro have shown very sharp 
fluctuations in credit in recent years.  
Differences in national credit market 
developments suggest that regional bubbles with 
specific profiles can emerge and develop 
independently of the single monetary policy 
(Graph I.2).  
Graph I.2: Growth in mortgage loans, euro-
area countries (average, median and dispersion 
of m-o-m changes in %, Jan 2002 to Sep 2010) 
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Source: ECB, Commission services. 
I.3.  Distortions created by asset price 
bubbles and excessive credit growth  
Distortions in the assessment of risks 
Loans for housing form a significant part of 
banks’ balance sheets in some euro-area Member 
States (Graph I.5). The resulting dependency of 
banks’ balance sheets on the quality of housing 
loans and on the level of house prices highlights 
several areas of potential vulnerability:  
• House price bubbles can significantly contribute 
to distorting banks’ perception of risks, as shown 
in euro-area surveys on changing lending 
standards (Graph I.6). The collateral — in the 
present case the claim on the dwelling — serves 
                                                        
(6) For an assessment of the size of house price misalignments in 
some euro-area Member States, see European Commission 
(2010), ‘House price imbalances in the euro area’, Quarterly 
Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 9, No 3. 
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Graph I.3: Lending for house purchases, euro-area countries  
(y-o-y changes in %, index of notional stocks, Dec. 2003 to Sep. 2010) (1) 
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(1) Lending for house purchase in the balance sheets of MFIs (excluding the Eurosystem). Data for CY unavailable for part of the period. In 
Belgium the securitization of mortgage loans (not recorded in the balance sheets of credit institutions) explains much of the decrease in 
lending for house purposes in 2009. 
Source:  ECB, Commission services. 
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Graph I.4: Lending for house purchases, euro-area countries  
(index of notional stocks, end of period, m-o-m changes in %, Dec. 2003 to Sep. 2010) (cont) (1) 
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(1) Lending for house purchase in the balance sheets of MFIs (excluding the Eurosystem). Data for MT, SI, SK unavailable for part of the 
period.  
Source:  ECB, Commission services. 
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to mitigate counterparty credit risk and to 
increase the amount the creditor is willing to 
offer. In the asset price build-up phase, the value 
of the collateral tends to grow faster than that of 
the loan portfolio, conveying the misperception 
that counterparty credit risk is on the decline. 
This myopic valuation of the collateral increases 
incentives for higher leverage and creates 
distortive balance sheet effects. The downturn 
phase elicits a net loss in bank assets, thereby 
exposing uncovered counterparty credit risk and 
possibly inadequate capital levels. (7)
Graph I.5: Households' loans in banks' balance 
sheets, euro-area countries (2008, in %) (1) 
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(1) Data are not available for FI. 
Source: Ecowin, Commission services. 
• Rising asset prices induce retail borrowers to sell 
or refinance rather than default, since they are 
less threatened with financial loss. This makes 
banks consider mortgage finance less risky than 
financing productive investment and can sway 
their business model towards a higher exposure 
in mortgage loans. Moreover, reliance on bank 
borrowing triggers a wide-ranging leverage 
effect and increasing reliance on bank financing, 
as retail borrowers seek to maximise their 
borrowing relative to their income; banks will 
also aim to optimise their asset-liability 
management (possibly involving innovative 
financing methods) to match a larger loan 
portfolio to their available capital. 
• Persistent house price increases can involve a 
mispricing of capital and perverse incentives for 
funding. Market participants, whether they 
recognise an asset bubble episode or attribute it 
to an independent improvement of fundamentals, 
                                                        
(7) The EU Commission has launched the Responsible Mortgage 
Lending and Borrowing initiative to mandate an adequate 
prior assessment of the borrowers' creditworthiness. The 
legislation should be adopted during spring 2011. 
may also engage in speculative behaviours. (8) 
This feeds growing discrepancies between prices 
and fundamentals. It also entrenches the 
misconception that asset bubbles are beneficial to 
the sustainability of risk-taking balance sheet 
orientation. Furthermore, in the absence of 
adequate funding resources banks tend to rely 
more heavily on wholesale funding, which can 
exacerbate balance-sheet maturity mismatches if 
deposits prove inadequate.  
• A house price bubble gives the false impression 
of a benign outlook for overall bank risks, as 
assets tend to grow more quickly than liabilities. 
As a result, the underestimation of risks leads 
banks to support a relaxing of credit standards, 
including low down-payments and some 
supervisory forbearance, and seek a more 
favourable tax and accounting treatment to shore 
up balance sheets.  
Graph I.6: Credit standards on loan to 
households for house purchases, euro area 
(net % of banks reporting a tightening, 2003Q1 
to 2010Q4) 
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Source: ECB Bank Lending Survey.  
Impact on the conduct of monetary policy and 
on risks to financial stability 
Asset price bubbles hamper the proper 
transmission of monetary policy and render the 
outcome of monetary policy more difficult to 
predict. Against this background, recent research 
at the ECB indicates that economic conditions 
may sometimes necessitate taking steps to limit 
the effects of asset price bubbles so as to restore 
                                                        
(8) See in particular Abreu, D. and M.K. Brunnermeier (2003), 
‘Bubbles and crashes’, Econometrica, Vol. 71, No 1, pp. 173-
204. 
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the integrity of monetary policy instruments. (9) 
However, the conditions under which central bank 
measures can be effective in curbing the effect of 
asset price misalignments remain unclear. 
Furthermore, a common monetary policy cannot 
adequately address regional housing bubbles in 
the euro area. 
Asset price bubbles and excessive credit growth 
increase systemic risk. Boom phases in house 
prices feed excessive investment and promote 
credit expansion. At the level of the individual 
banks, this does not necessarily create systemic 
risk since bank managers are expected to maintain 
adequate capital to match risks. However, the 
interplay of financial innovation, increased 
leverage, and banks' interconnectedness 
predispose bank balance sheets to amplify 
systemic risk. The possible presence of 
macroeconomic imbalances directly or indirectly 
related to asset prices (e.g. external deficits or 
public deficits) further increases such a risk, with 
a potential for contagion through market and 
balance sheet linkages between banks and the rest 
of the economy. 
I.4. Regulatory and supervisory tools to 
limit financial instability risks  
Given the distortions created by housing bubbles 
and the associated risks to financial stability, there 
is a need to design policy frameworks that can 
reduce the occurrence of bubbles and mitigate 
their effects. For that purpose, policy makers have 
a range of possible policy instruments at their 
disposal (see Table I.1). In the euro area, attempts 
to contain harmful regional house price bubbles 
need to be tailored to regional market conditions. 
National tax instruments can make a potentially 
valuable contribution to this aim. Furthermore, 
micro-prudential tools have an important role to 
play in preventing and mitigating the impact of 
asset price bubbles. While the prevention of asset 
and credit bubbles is not the main pursuit of 
micro-prudential oversight, measures targeted at 
the reduction of systemic risk and pro-cyclicality 
have the potential to curb excessive credit growth 
and the generation of asset price inflation.  
The global financial turmoil prompted a wide 
range of regulatory reforms, including a complete 
overhaul of supervisory structures in the European 
Union. The main aim of these reforms is to 
                                                        
(9) The ECB has recently argued that ‘both the experience of the 
recent financial crisis and the results of economic research 
have strengthened the case for central banks “leaning against 
the wind” of asset price bubbles’. See ECB, ibid. 
reinforce the surveillance and monitoring of the 
financial system, shore up the solvency of the 
banking sector, and strengthen the overall 
financial stability of the system. The litmus test 
for these measures is their ability to dampen the 
pro-cyclicality of banking activity and reduce the 
sources of regulatory arbitrage while reinforcing 
international convergence and preserving the level 
playing field.  
Although the regulatory reforms are applicable to 
the entire European Union, they are all the more 
necessary in the euro area due to the limitations of 
the single monetary policy to counteract potential 
financial imbalances on a country-by-country or 
regional basis. This sub-section reviews a range of 
regulatory and supervisory tools that have the 
potential to keep banks’ leverage in check and 
thereby limit the risk of house price bubbles.  
 
Table I.1: Selected policy instruments to help 
limit housing bubbles 
Monetary Policy 
Tax policy
Reduction of mortgage interest relief
Taxation of imputed rents (owner-occupied houses)
Property holding and transaction taxation
Regulatory policy
Capital adequacy requirements 
Counter-cyclical capital buffers
Loan-loss provisioning rules
Accounting standards  (e.g. asset valuation)
Maximum exposure limits
Maximum leverage ratios
Loan-to-value (LTV) limits
Loan-to-income (LTI) limits
Source: Commission services. 
 
While the discretion granted to supervisors under 
Pillar 2 of the Basel framework provides the 
flexibility needed to apply many of these tools 
with a certain amount of judgment, it also creates 
the risk of inconsistent implementation across 
countries. The newly created European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB) will therefore play a pivotal 
role in identifying potential imbalances as well as 
risks to the stability of the financial system as a 
whole. Moreover, the new procedure proposed by 
the Commission on 29 September on the 
surveillance of macro-economic imbalances 
provides for an additional, complementary 
instrument to identify macro-financial risks early 
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on and to devise appropriate policy responses. 
One of the strengths of this new surveillance 
procedure, which will be operated in close 
relationship with the ESRB, is that it should 
provide effective instruments to monitor and 
ensure the proper implementation of measures 
that are deemed necessary to correct imbalances, 
possibly including financial sanctions.  
Effective prevention of imbalances will require 
identifying housing bubbles on a timely basis and 
developing a good understanding of their 
ramifications in terms destabilising the financial 
system. This will clearly not be an easy task. For 
the supervisory bodies concerned, it will mean 
good access to timely micro data, the 
development of strong analytical tools and 
drawing on outstanding expertise in the economic 
sectors concerned. Recent economic research 
appears relatively encouraging in this context, 
pointing to a range of instruments and indicators 
that can be useful in detecting asset price 
misalignments and signalling financial distress 
early on. (10) But much further work is needed in 
that area.  
Improving the valuation of assets 
The rules for the valuation of financial assets (fair 
value and other valuation criteria) can have a 
strong influence on investment decisions made by 
banks. These rules determine whether the 
fluctuations of financial asset prices are translated 
into profits or losses in the banks' accounts.  
Asset classes that are valued at market price at all 
times (marked-to-market) exert considerable 
volatility on banks’ balance sheets, thereby 
potentially amplifying pro-cyclicality and 
bubbles. (11) 
Until recently, mortgage loan assets were mainly 
held by retail banks with a low risk profile. They 
were not marked-to-market but valued using more 
conservative valuation standards. However, in the 
run-up to the crisis, the high yields offered by 
                                                        
(10) See, for instance, ECB (ibid.) and Bank for International 
Settlements (2010), 'Macroprudential policy and addressing 
procyclicality', BIS 80th annual Report (June). 
(11) For example, the accounting standards generally applied in 
the euro area — the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) — prescribe that derivative contracts not 
serving to hedge positions must be valued at all times using 
fair value where fair value is marked-to-market or a valuation 
following market price fluctuations. According to the IASB, 
the definition of fair value is ‘the price that would be received 
to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly 
transaction between market participants at the measurement 
date’. 
complex financial instruments based on mortgage 
loans generated large capital inflows which were 
used for residential property lending. In most 
cases these instruments were held for speculative 
purposes and were marked-to-market.  
Following the famous ‘originate-to-distribute’ 
model, mortgage loans were extended massively, 
on the back of an ever-increasing mortgage-
backed securities market. As a result, residential 
mortgages became accessible to a wider spectrum 
of borrowers and a spiral was set in motion of 
increased demand for real estate, rapid growth of 
mortgage loans and further asset price increases, 
which turned out to be one of the roots of the 
financial crisis.  
In reaction to these root causes and other 
accelerating factors of the crisis, the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) have 
undertaken a full revision of the accounting 
standards which determine the valuation of 
financial instruments. (12)  
Impact of the rules on loan-loss provisioning 
Appropriate rules for loan-loss provisioning can 
reduce pro-cyclicality and provide a cushion in 
the event of unforeseen loan losses. Essentially, 
loan-loss provisioning seeks to compensate for 
expected future losses that occur if a borrower 
does not repay according to the loan contract. The 
rules for provisioning have a strong impact on the 
accounting value and the yield of loans, credits 
and other receivables since provisions lower the 
value of the loans and reduce the profits of the 
entity which holds these instruments.  
Currently, International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) follow an incurred loss 
approach, where specific provisions can only be 
registered when an event has an impact on the 
estimated future cash-flow of the loan. Empirical 
evidence suggests that this accounting 
methodology may generate a dangerous time lag 
before the underlying losses in a loan portfolio are 
registered. By way of example, in the period that 
preceded the crisis, the amount of loans in arrears 
and provisions sunk to very low levels. However, 
when the crisis began, loans in arrears started 
swelling, increasing abruptly the amount of 
provisions. This approach has proved extremely 
pro-cyclical, further choking access to financing 
                                                        
(12) The International Accounting Standards Board is the 
accounting standard setter responsible for publication of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards applied most 
commonly in the euro area. 
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and aggravating the impact of the crisis 
(Graph I.7).  
Graph I.7: Loan-loss provisioning in selected 
euro-area banks (in bn EUR, end of year) 
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Source: Bloomberg, Orbis, Commission services. 
Already in 2000, Spanish regulators decided to 
supplement the current incurred-loss approach 
with a dynamic provisioning mechanism. With 
dynamic provisioning, the level of provisions 
increases during the economic upturn, thereby 
tempering the pro-cyclicality of the incurred-loss 
approach and providing a capital reserve in case 
unforeseen losses materialise. 
Drawing on the experience of the crisis, the IASB 
is currently revising the applicable rules for loan-
loss provisioning in order to adopt a more 
forward-looking provisioning approach that is 
able to cushion against potential future losses. 
This measure is set to modify the yield and the 
valuation of the loan portfolio, partly correcting 
the incentives to invest in residential property. 
Measures influencing the volume of credit 
A number of measures can be employed to 
influence credit growth. The volume of credit 
supplied to the economy can be constrained by 
imposing limits either on banks or on borrowers. 
On the one hand, the total amount of lending can 
be limited by imposing additional capital 
requirements, binding leverage ratios or rules on 
large exposures on banks. On the other hand, the 
capacity of entities or individuals to borrow can 
be constrained by rules stipulating specific Loan-
To-Value (LTV) or Loan-To-Income (LTI) ratios 
for determining the access to credit. These rules 
limit the amount of money that can be borrowed 
by an individual or a company based on the value 
of the collateral (LTV) or on the level of income 
(LTI), which could eventually contain excessive 
credit growth.  
However, empirical evidence shows that the 
effectiveness of these measures depends on a 
number of factors. In the build-up to the US 
subprime crisis, for instance, financial institutes 
granted mortgage loans against the value of the 
collateral. The creditworthiness of the borrower 
played only a negligible role. As it turned out, the 
LTV approach was part of the problem in the 
sense that it fuelled a speculative spiral and 
contributed to the inflation of residential and 
commercial property rather than anchoring credit 
to its fundamentals.  
Graph I.8: Distribution of mortgages by Loan-
To-Value ratios, Dublin area, Ireland  
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Source: Department of the Environment, Heritage and 
Local Government in Ireland and Commission services. 
This experience teaches important lessons. First, 
LTV rules must be sufficiently stringent to ensure 
that the value of the collateral will cover bank 
losses even in the event of overpricing of the 
assets that are pledged against the loan. Secondly, 
the assessment of the value of the collateral 
should go hand-in-hand with a proper assessment 
of the creditworthiness of the borrower. In other 
words, effective rules for mortgage loans should 
combine both LTV and appropriate LTI ratios. 
Assessing credit risk on the basis of the value of 
collateral alone creates the wrong incentives.  
The setting of binding thresholds based on both 
LTV and LTI ratios could have helped to avoid 
excessive credit growth in Ireland and Spain, too. 
As Graph I.8 shows, in Ireland the share of risky 
exposures with LTV ratios beyond prudent levels 
were significant and the ratio of total liabilities to 
disposable income had reached very high levels in 
the run-up to the crisis (Graph I.9).  
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Graph I.9: Ratio of loan to disposable income, 
Spain and Ireland (in %) 
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While average LTV levels remained within 
reasonable limits in Spain (Graph I.10), the ratio 
of total liabilities to disposable income surged in 
the years preceding the crisis (Graph I.9). 
Graph I.11 also shows that the highest loss rates 
in Spain were registered in the construction and 
property development portfolios. The problems in 
this sector may have been avoided by diversifying 
much more the loan portfolio and applying more 
stringent LTI thresholds. 
Graph I.10: Distribution of retail mortgage 
credit by Loan-To-Value ratios, Spain  
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Fiscal measures provide another policy lever to 
influence the demand for mortgage loans. In 
particular, tax measures reducing tax deductibility 
for mortgage payments for retail borrowers, as 
well as measures to combat excessive loan 
portfolio held by banks can prove effective. As 
regards external factors contributing to house 
price bubbles, imposing a levy on incoming 
foreign direct investment in real estate could help 
limit the pressure on house prices.  
However, the most common way of reducing the 
volume of bank lending is by increasing its 
financing cost by augmenting the amount of 
capital that banks have to hold for an asset class. 
This could act on both the supply of and the 
demand for credit by reducing banks’ capacity to 
lend and, assuming the extra cost of capital will 
be partly passed on to the borrowers, dampening 
credit demand. 
Prudential capital requirements can be modified 
using two regulatory mechanisms: capital charges 
for specific asset categories and the introduction 
of additional capital buffers. (13) By raising the 
capital charge of certain assets, regulators can 
modify the incentives for investing in a certain 
asset category and reduce the amount of 
associated capital inflows. For instance, the 
second amendment to the Capital Requirements 
Directive (CRD) 2006/49/EC, proposed in July 
2009, has imposed more stringent rules on 
securitised assets to change modify incentives 
linked to these transactions and their underlying 
mortgages. 
Graph I.11: Ratios of doubtful assets for credit 
to the resident sector, Spain (in % of credit) 
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The second mechanism to constrain the volume of 
credit is the introduction of additional counter-
cyclical capital buffers. These buffers are 
calculated on the basis of macroeconomic 
variables, most commonly with reference to credit 
and GDP growth. The purpose is to identify and 
dampen periods of excessive growth (often linked 
                                                        
(13) This can be done by increasing the weighting scheme of 
specific assets in the computation of Risk-Weighted Assets 
(RWA), which form the denominator of the regulatory capital 
ratio (such as Tier I under the Basel framework). 
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to the appearance of bubbles) by introducing a 
higher capital target. In the near future, the ESRB 
is set to contribute to prudential rules by advising 
on counter-cyclical buffers. (14)  
The leverage ratio is another measure of credit 
expansion, which, if restricted, could result in 
constraining the ability of banks to extend new 
loans since they would have to raise extra capital 
to continue expanding their balance sheet beyond 
this limit. In the context of an emerging asset 
price bubble, banks would probably seek to pass 
on the additional cost of capital to borrowers 
either through interest rate increases (price limit), 
or by limiting the magnitude of lending 
(quantitative limit).  
Finally, rules on excessive concentration of risk 
are primarily meant to strengthen financial 
stability by improving the banking sector’s 
diversification. The Capital Requirements 
Directive (CRD), 2006/48/EC, adopted on 
14 June 2006 sets specific limits to large 
exposures held by banks. (15) Nevertheless, the 
existing rules on large exposures (16) have little 
bearing in the case of asset price bubbles, as the 
regulation does not provide for the possibility of 
imposing limits on a bank’s exposure to a specific 
sector such as the real estate sector. The new 
supervisory architecture could allow the ESRB to 
monitor this type of concentration (by sector or 
asset class) with a view to possibly imposing 
temporary limitations when a bubble is building 
up. 
                                                        
(14) The next round of amendments to the CRD (CRD4) 
envisages the introduction of counter-cyclical capital buffers. 
(15) In particular, the Directive (2006/48/EC) sets limits for 
exposures to clients or groups of connected clients under the 
tools to limit credit risk. Clients are considered to be 
connected if there is a relationship of control between them 
or if, in the absence of such a relationship, the financial 
difficulties experienced by one client would be likely to 
provoke repayment or funding difficulties for all the other 
clients. 
(16) Articles 106 to 118 of Directive 2006/48/EC. 
I.5. Conclusion 
Regulatory action to constrain banks’ balance 
sheets can assist in controlling the occurrence and 
magnitude of housing price bubbles. It requires a 
coherent effort to integrate supervisory tools into 
a wider macro-policy approach that protects 
financial stability if the occurrence of macro-
financial imbalances is to be prevented. In this 
vein, the creation of the European System of 
Financial Supervisors (EFSF) (allying the ESRB 
and the European Supervisory Authorities) will 
encourage balancing the micro-prudential 
supervisory tools with a macro-prudential 
approach to systemic risks. Moreover, the new 
broader macro-economic surveillance procedure 
proposed by the Commission will provide a 
complementary tool to detect and address 
unsustainable macro-financial trends early on. 
Meanwhile, the adoption of stronger capital 
requirements for banks by the end of this decade 
will buttress bank’s resilience. Improved 
regulatory action also requires timely and 
comprehensive access to micro-based information 
that is evaluated using strong analytical tools. 
However, there is a need to keep up momentum to 
implement early corrective policies for 
safeguarding resilience of financial institutions 
and markets. The possible tension between the 
need to support aggregate demand could result in 
trade-offs that could ultimately dent the credibility 
of risk management and that weaken the 
commitment to the collective benefits of financial 
stability. 
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II.1. The impact of the financial crisis 
on the integration of the euro-area 
banking sector 
Introduction 
Prior to the financial crisis, many banks expanded 
their balance sheets by increasing the use of 
wholesale funding, (17) allowing them to develop 
cross-border activities or even to acquire and 
integrate foreign banks within their groups. This 
integration process improved efficiency and 
profitability in the banking sector through 
increased competition, price transparency, 
interoperability among the participants and 
transfers of technology and managerial skills. 
Empirical evidence points to lower loan rates or 
higher deposit rates resulting from this process of 
integration. (18)  
                                                        
(17) As opposed to a more stable source of funding such as 
customer deposits. 
(18) European Commission (2007), ‘Report of the Retail Banking 
Inquiry’, Commission Staff Working Document; European 
Although critics of banking sector consolidation 
point to the risk of job losses and failed business 
strategies, the empirical evidence shows that 
cross-border activity provides a greater 
competitive impulse to national banking markets 
than purely domestic integration and that foreign 
bank entry tends to enhance consumer 
welfare. (19) 
                                                                                  
Commission (2008), ‘EMU@10 — Successes and challenges 
after ten years of EMU’, European Economy Vol. 2 2008; 
SEC(2007) 106; Jimenez, G., J.A. Lopez, and J. Saurina 
(2007), ‘How does competition impact bank risk-taking?’, 
Federal Reserve Board of San Francisco, Working Paper No 
2007-23; Humphrey, D.B. (2009), ‘Payment scale economies, 
competition and pricing’, ECB Working Paper Series No 
1136. 
(19) In view of these potential economic benefits arising from 
cross-border activity between banks, the European 
Commission has been working since 2004 to examine the 
barriers to cross-border consolidation in the financial sector 
and how to address existing inefficiencies. Walkner, C. and 
J.P. Raes (2005), ‘Integration and consolidation in EU 
banking — an unfinished business’, DG ECFIN Economic 
Paper No 226. 
The financial crisis has had a strong impact on the euro-area banking sector. In particular, the restructuring 
process that was initiated by the crisis and is still ongoing has slightly changed the trends in bank mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A). The cross-border dimension of these M&A operations is a key indicator of the integration 
process of the euro-area banking sector, which is fundamental to the integration and deepening of the EU 
internal market. The analysis presented in the first section of this chapter shows that the process of market 
integration is still ongoing, although at a slower pace as a consequence of the crisis and of the ensuing 
restructuring of the banking sector. Furthermore, the process of market integration is not uniform across 
countries and types of banks. In particular, some large banks appear to have continued to expand across 
borders. 
The second section in this chapter looks into the effect of the sovereign debt crisis on the recovery process in 
the euro-area financial sector. The deterioration of investors’ perception of sovereign risk has contributed to a 
negative feedback loop between public finances and financial market developments. It has also raised funding 
costs for banks in a number of Member States and has complicated the process of banks’ balance sheet repair. 
The emergence of some sovereign bonds as risky assets has segmented the investor base and led to higher 
funding costs for some Member States, while at the same time benchmark interest rates have fallen in the euro 
area. Lower benchmark rates may stimulate economic activity, but they may also reduce profit margins in the 
financial industry and encourage risk-taking. Overall, the sovereign debt crisis has led to the recovery in the 
financial system becoming even more dependent on the strength of economic recovery than before. 
External financing of non-financial corporations has traditionally been more bank-based in the euro area than 
in the US. Nevertheless, the last section argues that this may be changing. The surge in bond issuance by non-
financial corporations in 2009 and the persistently high share of bonds in corporations’ external funding in 
2010 suggest that the euro-area corporate sector may have responded to the financial crisis and the tightening 
of bank credit conditions by diversifying its sources of external funding. If persistent, this diversification 
process would make part of the euro-area corporate sector — mostly large companies — less reliant on banks. 
It would also entail a shift of bank lending towards small and medium-sized enterprises. 
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The global financial crisis has acted as a shock to 
the ongoing transformation of the banking sector. 
As in other advanced economies, the majority of 
euro-area banks have been strongly affected by 
the sharp retrenchment on the interbank market, 
the balance sheet deterioration due to toxic and 
otherwise illiquid assets, and the collapse of 
global demand that followed Lehman’s 
bankruptcy, although with varying degrees of 
intensity and some differences in timing of the 
distress. 
The severe loss of liquidity in the asset-backed 
securities markets coupled with higher levels of 
non-performing loans hampered banks in 
performing one of their core functions, namely 
financing the real economy. At the same time, 
these circumstances forced banks to stop or delay 
their integration plans.  
Integration of the euro-area banking sector can be 
assessed through different indicators, for instance 
the amount of foreign branches and subsidiaries; 
cross-border M&A; and the provision of services 
on a cross-border basis. This section focuses on 
cross-border M&A activity in order to shed some 
light on the challenges that cross-border banking 
integration is currently facing. (20) It shows that 
the process of market integration is still ongoing, 
although at a slower pace as a consequence of the 
crisis and the ensuing restructuring of the banking 
sector.  
The financial crisis boosted State aid and bank 
restructuring under EU rules  
Since the beginning of the crisis, significant 
restructuring has been carried out in the euro-area 
banking sector under close scrutiny of the 
Commission. Some degree of restructuring has 
typically been a condition for banks to be granted 
access to public support measures. 
Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), State aid that distorts 
competition is in principle prohibited. However, 
faced with the severity and systemic nature of the 
financial crisis, the Commission decided to 
urgently reassess the conditions for the 
application of the State aid framework, and in 
acknowledgement of the risk of a ‘severe 
disturbance to the economy’ thereby allowed 
                                                        
(20) Mergers can be defined as the fusion of organisations 
(generally of comparable size) into one legal entity. 
Acquisitions are transactions where one firm purchases a 
controlling stake in another one, without necessarily 
combining the involved firm’s assets. 
some State aid as laid down in Article 107(3)(b) 
TFEU. To limit the distorting effects of such aid, 
the Commission produced various guidelines in 
the form of four Communications. (21) The 
Restructuring Communication (22) details the 
particular features that a restructuring plan (or a 
viability plan) has to display in the specific 
context of crisis-related State aid granted to 
financial institutions on the basis of 
Article 107(3)(b). 
In assessing the restructuring requirements, the 
Commission takes into consideration the specific 
situation of each financial institution and in 
particular the degree to which such restructuring 
is necessary to restore viability without further 
State support. The main principle of restructuring 
is that it should lead to restoration of the viability 
of the undertaking in the longer term without 
State aid. As a general rule, the greater the 
reliance on government aid, the stronger the 
indication of a need to undergo in-depth 
restructuring in order to ensure long-term 
viability. Nevertheless, the individual assessment 
takes account of the individual situation and 
applies the restructuring framework in an 
appropriately flexible manner in the event of a 
severe shock endangering financial stability in 
one or more Member States. 
So far, restructuring has taken two main forms: 
the sale of distressed banks and divestments of 
certain assets or activities (including through the 
sale to a “bad bank”).  
Sale of the bank. The sale of a distressed bank to 
another bank is considered as an appropriate 
element of restructuring. It can contribute to the 
restoration of long-term viability if the purchaser 
is viable and capable of absorbing the distressed 
bank. The sale of a bank has a consolidating effect 
within the sector. This consolidation can be of a 
domestic nature or cross-border, leading to 
relatively less or more cross-border banking 
integration respectively. (23)  
                                                        
(21) These Communications provide detailed guidance on the 
criteria for the compatibility of State support to banks with 
the requirements of Article 107(3)(b). Three of the four 
documents set out the prerequisites for the compatibility of 
the main types of assistance granted by Member States — 
guarantees on liabilities, recapitalisations and asset relief 
measures. 
(22) European Commission (2009), ‘Communication on the return 
to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in 
the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid 
rules’, OJ C 195, 19.8.2009. 
(23) An interesting case is the break-up of Fortis SA/NV, which 
led to more cross-border banking between Belgium and 
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Divestment. Banks benefiting from State aid are in 
some cases required to divest subsidiaries, 
branches, and portfolios of customers or other 
activities. In order for such measures to increase 
competition and support the internal market, the 
Commission seeks measures favouring the entry 
of competitors and cross-border activity. (24) It 
therefore pays particular attention to restructuring 
measures being undertaken without discrimination 
between banks from different Member States.   
Although restructuring is specific to each 
individual bank, a broad examination of the 
various restructuring plans submitted so far to the 
Commission allows some main trends to be 
identified. 
The most obvious effect of all restructuring plans 
is the reduction in size of the financial institution 
concerned. This reduction in size is not only a 
direct consequence of the need to return to 
viability, but may also arise from the obligation to 
ensure adequate burden-sharing (the divestment of 
certain activities or areas allowing the 
restructuring to be self-financed) and to adopt 
compensatory measures for competition 
distortions created by the aid (to foster 
competition by giving opportunities to new 
entrants to acquire existing activities).  
The second obvious effect of restructuring 
operations is a general tendency for distressed 
banks to refocus the activity of the institution 
concerned on domestic activities and core 
business. The need to restore viability often leads 
to a concentration on market segments that are 
deemed the safest, which are typically the ones 
the institution is most familiar with. This explains 
the abandonment of exotic segments, in terms of 
both activities and geographic areas. Therefore, 
the divestment process leads naturally to a re-
concentration on national markets.  
Such measures often follow directly from the 
actions of the banks themselves, for the following 
reasons. First, difficulties of the distressed banks 
often originated from having ventured into 
unfamiliar markets and/or geographic areas during 
previous years through a process of M&A. 
Second, these distressed banks (e.g. RBS, Fortis, 
                                                                                  
France through the acquisition of Fortis BE by BNP Paribas, 
and a more domestically owned banking sector in the 
Netherlands. 
(24) It should be pointed out that the Commission does not as such 
propose or dictate the restructuring actions, but only assesses 
them after submission by the beneficiary of the aid in 
cooperation with the national government involved. 
ING) were typically large systemic banks with 
substantial cross-border activities. This favoured a 
number of specific divestments, from both a 
financial stability and a corporate profitability 
perspective. While government interventions in 
the restructuring negotiations have sometimes 
revealed a temptation to preserve national 
ownership of domestic financial activities, bank 
restructuring and divestments have made it 
possible for more solid non-aided banks to expand 
abroad. (25)  
Restructuring operations under EU rules were not 
evenly distributed geographically. Some Member 
States, including large ones, did not see any of 
their financial institutions undergo restructuring at 
all (Italy, France, (26) Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus), 
or have had only a very limited number so far 
(Portugal). On the other hand, some Member 
States had a large number of their financial 
institutions restructured, representing a significant 
share of the total sector. This was particularly the 
case in Belgium and the Netherlands (which had 
very concentrated financial sectors), but also in 
Ireland and in Germany, where Landesbanken 
were the sources of significant difficulties. The 
situation in Greece is somewhat particular, as its 
financial institutions did not display indications of 
distress at the beginning of the crisis, only coming 
under pressure recently due to the persistence of 
the crisis and the emergence of sovereign 
difficulties. 
But banks have also restructured on their own 
initiative  
Beyond the cases of restructuring under EU rules, 
some banks have chosen to restructure on their 
own initiative, in order to avoid government 
intervention or to restore market confidence. 
These restructuring operations were aimed at 
creating sounder and more cohesive entities, 
leading in some cases to refocusing on a smaller 
set of activities, which in turn has had an effect on 
the cross-border presence of banks. The 
divestments of certain activities and particular 
types of assets have reduced the size of these 
banks’ balance sheets and improved their capital 
ratios, in a similar way to the process observed for 
publicly rescued banks. 
Other banks have also aimed at cleaning and 
strengthening directly their balance sheets, by 
                                                        
(25) To some extent, this ‘nationalism’ matches the sovereign 
dimension of the aid provided by the Member States to their 
systemic domestic banks. 
(26) Disregarding the Belgian-French group Dexia. 
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writing-down or selling impaired assets and 
portfolios and by raising additional capital, partly 
also in order to meet expected higher capital 
requirements. (27)  
Bank M&A and divestment data point to 
slower international integration  
In a historic perspective, two peaks for cross-
border M&A deals in the banking sector are 
evident, one following the launch of the Single 
European Act in the late 1980s, and another in the 
late 1990s, prior to the creation of the euro. More 
recently, a relative decline in the number of 
announced M&A deals is evident following a 
further peak in the third quarter of 2008 (see 
Graph II.1.1), around the Lehman collapse. This 
can be seen as a consequence of the crisis in view 
of the deterioration in market confidence and the 
difficulties in finding buyers. (28) 
Graph II.1.1: Evolution of M&A, euro-area 
banking sector (number of deals) 
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(1) Based on announcements. 
Source: Bloomberg and Commission services. 
While direct cross-border retail activity of banks 
is usually limited, the ownership of banks is much 
more internationalised. (29) Since 2006, more than 
                                                        
(27) Bloomberg estimates that €210bn of capital (both public and 
market capital) was raised by euro-area banks between 2008 
and June 2010. 
(28) The analysis hereafter is based on the Bloomberg M&A 
database. It includes all deals announced between 2006 and 
October 2010 where the target is a bank with residence in the 
euro area (537 deals), irrespective of the residence of the 
buyer and seller. The analysis focuses on the number of deals 
rather than on volumes for two reasons: (1) large transactions 
would bias the picture and (2) data availability. Terminated 
deals were ignored. Three actors may play a role in each deal: 
a seller, an acquirer and the target; however, for an 
acquisition of a full entity or in joint ventures, there are only 
two actors: acquirer and target. The database only includes 
divestments of parts of the banks, so that it gives no 
indication of the activities or departments that are terminated. 
(29) See, for instance, European Commission (2009), ‘European 
financial integration report 2009’, Commission Staff 
50 % of the M&A deals involved actors coming 
from at least two different countries.  
Graph II.1.2: M&A in the euro-area banking 
sector before the crisis  
(number of operations - 2006 to Sept 2008) (1) 
Domestic
43.9%
Intl.- More 
Integration
32.8%
Intl. - Less 
integration
7.2%
Intl. - Transfer
16.1%
(1) "Domestic" deals: all parties are resident in the same country. 
"Intl.": international deal, i.e. transaction involving at least one 
non-domestic entity. "More integration": ownership of the target 
moves away from its country of origin. "Less integration": 
ownership of the target moves back to its country of origin. 
"Transfer" (neutral): both acquirer and seller come from a 
country other than the one of the target. Based on announcement 
dates. Date of collapse of Lehman Brothers taken as the cutting 
point. 
Source: Bloomberg and Commission services. 
 
Graph II.1.3: M&A in the euro-area banking 
sector after the crisis  
(number of operations - Oct 2008 to Oct 2010) (1)
Domestic
47.9%
Intl. - More 
integration
24.5%
Intl. - Less 
integration
9.0%
Intl. - Transfer
18.6%
(1) See footnote of previous graph. 
Source: Bloomberg and Commission services. 
Graphs II.1.2 and II.1.3 describe the effect of 
M&A transactions on market integration within 
the euro area. The indicator ‘Intl. — More 
integration’ shows the share of transactions where 
the ownership of a domestic target in the euro area 
was transferred to a non-domestic bank. In most 
cases the acquiring entity is also located in the 
euro area, although the sample includes all 
                                                                                  
Working Paper, SEC(2009) 1702 or ECB (2010), ‘EU 
banking structures’, September. 
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transactions, i.e. also involving non-EU entities 
(buyers or sellers). The indicator recording more 
integration registered 32.8 % before the crisis 
(Graph II.1.2) and 24.5 % during and after the 
crisis (Graph II.1.3), indicating a slowdown in 
integration within the euro area. At the same time, 
the share of domestic transactions (30) and 
transactions leading to less integration have both 
increased, to 47.9 % from 43.9 % and to 9 % from 
7.2 % respectively. These three indicators point to 
a shift in the cross-border dimension of M&A 
towards a relatively slower pace of integration. 
But developments in cross-border deals vary 
depending on countries considered  
M&A transactions in the euro area were 
dominated by larger countries, in terms of the 
residency of targets, sellers and acquirers. Given 
the absolute size of the banking sectors of 
Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, it is not 
surprising that they account for the majority of 
transactions in all these categories. The total size 
of the banking system in Germany and France 
alone accounts for more than half of euro-area 
banking assets. This being said, it is also 
important to take into account the initial levels of 
integration and concentration when interpreting 
such figures, as a more highly concentrated 
banking sector is arguably less likely to offer as 
many potential target entities for M&A deals than 
a more fragmented one. (31)  
When looking at the origin of acquirers 
(Graph II.1.4) further differences between the 
euro-area countries are noteworthy. Firstly, most 
of the larger countries show a clear fall in the 
number of deals concluded between the pre-crisis 
period of 2006/2007 and the following three crisis 
years. Secondly, the reduction in M&A activity 
appears to have affected domestic and 
international transactions to a similar extent. One 
notable exception to this observation is the case of 
Spain and (to a lesser extent) the Netherlands, 
which saw a relative shift towards domestic 
acquisitions at the expense of deals featuring a 
foreign buyer from another euro-area country. 
Thirdly, looking at an extended sample that 
includes smaller euro-area countries (not 
depicted) further shows that M&A activity in 
smaller economies’ banking sectors is typically 
                                                        
(30) Domestic deals are those where the three actors (seller, 
acquirer and target) are resident in the same country. 
(31) For instance, Belgium, the Netherlands and Finland have 
highly concentrated banking sectors, while those in Germany 
and Italy are relatively fragmented according to the 
Herfindahl index. 
more international, with euro-area countries 
accounting for around a quarter of acquisitions. 
Cross-border banking integration in the euro area 
thus appears not to be uniform, as significant 
differences are apparent between larger and 
smaller countries’ banking sectors. However, this 
analysis does not afford any conclusions as to the 
extent to which this is due to the financial crisis 
and ensuing restructuring/divestment operations.  
Graph II.1.4: M&A in the euro-area banking 
sector, breakdown of origin by acquirers 
(number of deals pre-crisis [2006-07] and crisis 
period [2008 to Oct 2010]) 
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Source: Bloomberg and Commission sources. 
Some major euro-area banks have seized the 
opportunity to expand across borders 
Depending on the type of restructuring carried 
out, banks have either divested activities, raised 
capital (through shares or hybrid instruments), or 
used a combination of both measures to 
strengthen their financial position. Banks under 
restructuring following EU rules are in most cases 
prevented from any M&A activity that would lead 
to further expansion. Banks that were not directly 
supported by government interventions and that 
remained in comparatively good financial health 
have been in a better position to take advantage of 
M&A opportunities, given the comparatively low 
level of effective competition for an acquisition 
target and crisis-induced declines in the valuation 
of potential targets. As a result, some banks have 
acted mainly as acquirers, while other have 
mostly divested and reduced their activities. The 
analysis presented hereafter reveals that there are 
important geographical differences between 
sellers and acquirers, as most of the larger 
players’ acquisitions are international, whereas 
divestments tend to be domestic. 
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To give an indication of the movements within the 
euro area, Table II.1.1 ranks the most active banks 
in terms of their number of sales and acquisitions. 
A look at the top sellers reveals that many banks 
have indeed strengthened their positions by both 
divesting and raising additional capital. As for 
government support and the restructuring imposed 
by the Commission, there is little indication that 
restructuring following State aid has been the 
dominant cause of divestment within the euro 
area, as the top sellers were mainly banks free of 
any restructuring requirements. Thus, 
restructuring on banks’ own initiative, which in 
most cases has been a means to avoid government 
support, has been an important driver of changes 
in the banking sector as well. Similarly, the 
relationship between capital increases and 
divestment or acquisition activity is not 
straightforward as both sellers and acquirers have 
increased capital. 
For the largest sellers, the majority of divestments 
are domestic. This is contrary to the hypothesis 
that in general, across the euro area, banks have 
refocused on their domestic market and divested 
euro-area activities outside their own domestic 
market. For the acquirers, the cross-border 
element of M&A is more sizeable, indicating that 
the most active banks have actually expanded 
throughout the euro area. The large presence of 
French banks (32) in terms of the number of 
transactions is notable. Other active acquirers, 
mainly from Spain, Italy and Germany, did not 
receive support at any point during the crisis. 
Among the active acquirers, several banks have 
raised considerable amounts of capital as well. 
This places these banks in a good position to 
continue their M&A activities in the future. 
Taking into account the size of the more active 
buyers and sellers in combination with the earlier 
observation of an overall decrease in the cross-
border dimension of M&A transactions, it may be 
concluded that the overall trend depicted earlier – 
of a refocus of banks on their domestic markets –
does not hold for the most active and largest 
banks. Indeed, large acquiring banks have 
continued to expand their cross-border banking, 
while large sellers have divested more on their 
domestic markets.  
                                                        
(32) French banks benefited from public capital injections, but to 
a lesser extent than those of other large EU countries, and 
repaid the funds very rapidly. 
 
Table II.1.1: Top 10 acquirers and sellers by number of deals, euro-area banking sector (2006-2010) (1) 
Company Country Number of 
acquisitions
Total value 
(in million €) (2)
Government Support Capital Increase
(in billion €)
Total Assets       
(in trillion €)
BNP Paribas SA FR 17 (10) 18253 Y 9,4 (5,1) 2.1
Credit Agricole SA FR 17 (12) 24192 Y 8,9 (3,0) 1.6
Deutsche Bank AG DE 15 (3) 11940 N 20.5 1.9
Societe Generale SA FR 9 (2) 2329 Y 12,3 (3,4) 1.1
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA IT 7 (0) 29935 N 4.0 0.7
Deutsche Postbank AG DE 7 (0) 342 N 1.0 0.2
Natixis SA FR 7 (2) 14807 N 5.8 0.5
Banco Santander SA ES 6 (5) 1398 N 20.4 1.2
Marfin Popular Bank Public Co Ltd CY 6 (4) 1160 N 0.0 0.0
Banco Popular Espanol SA ES 6 (1) 627 N 1.2 0.1
Company Country Number of 
divestments
Total value 
(in million €) (3)
Government Support Capital Increase
(in billion €)
Total Assets       
(in trillion €)
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA IT 21 (2) 12202 N 4.0 0.7
Commerzbank AG DE 11 (5) 1112 Y 18,2 (18,2) 0.9
UniCredit SpA IT 16 (5) 4823 N 11.0 1.0
RBS Holdings NV NL 7 (2) 589 N 0.0 0.5
Banco Popolare SC IT 7 (0) 1225 Y 1,5 (1,5) 0.1
HSBC Holdings PLC GB 6 (6) 2391 N 21.3 1.7
Deutsche Bank AG DE 6 (1) 352 N 20.5 1.9
BNP Paribas FR 6 (2) 0 Y 9,4 (5,1) 2.1
Citigroup Inc US 6 (4) 4900 Y N/A 1.6
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA IT 6 (0) 822 Y 1,9 (1,9) 0.2
Top 10 Acquirers
Top 10 Sellers
(1) 'Capital increases' include both public injections (in brackets) and capital raised on the market. For 'Number of acquisitions' and 'Number 
of divestments', numbers in brackets refer to euro-area transactions other than domestic.
(2) Total value includes only the value of acquisitions for which the sum was disclosed at the time of acquisition.
(3) Total assets at the end of December 2009. 
Source:  Bloomberg and Commission services. 
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Conclusion  
The financial crisis has had a tremendous impact 
on the euro-area banking sector. In particular, the 
restructuring process initiated during the crisis is 
still ongoing and has changed the trends in bank 
M&A transactions. The cross-border dimension of 
these M&A operations is a key indicator of the 
euro-area banking sector integration process, 
which is fundamental to the integration and 
deepening of the EU internal market. 
The tentative evidence provided in the analysis at 
hand would indicate that the process of market 
integration is still ongoing, although at a slower 
pace as a consequence of the crisis and bank 
restructuring. Overall, M&A transactions have 
moved towards more domestic and ‘repatriating’ 
transactions, at the expense of transactions 
fostering international market integration.  
However, differences across countries emerge. 
First of all, cross-border banking integration is not 
a uniform development within the euro area. A 
division exists between the larger countries’ 
banking sectors and the smaller ones. Larger 
banking sectors’ transactions are more 
domestically focused and the majority of 
acquisitions are by domestic banks. For the 
smaller banking sectors, the nature of transactions 
was predominantly international, including the 
euro area. But, with the exception of Spain, there 
do not seem to be diverging trends between the  
‘pre–crisis’ and ‘post-crisis’ period in terms of 
geographic integration patterns, other than the 
clear fall in the number of M&A deals. 
Secondly, data on the most active acquirers and 
sellers tentatively confirm that distressed banks 
have used both divestments and capital injections 
to strengthen their balance sheets, whereas 
stronger banks seem to have used the capital they 
raised during the crisis to expand. Often these 
large banks have divested more on their domestic 
markets and expanded throughout the rest of the 
euro area. Therefore, given their size, these banks 
are a crucial element in cross-border banking. 
The impact on the various different banking 
activities, such as retail and wholesale activities, 
is not yet visible. Furthermore, the effect on other 
indicators of banking integration such as 
mortgage and deposit rates across countries is yet 
to be ascertained. Further investigation will have 
to reveal the impact of the financial crisis on these 
specific aspects.  
Although a more cautious pace of expansion may 
have been expected in the light of the crisis, some 
banks have clearly seized the opportunity offered 
by the crisis in terms of cross-border expansion. 
Yet, most institutes have slowed their venturing 
into further cross-border integration for the 
moment. If this trend were continued it could 
herald an important change in the landscape of the 
euro-area’s banking sector. 
 
 
 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area IV/2010 
 
- 24 -
II.2. Has the sovereign debt crisis 
hampered the recovery process in the 
euro-area financial sector? 
The recovery from the financial crisis progressed 
considerably in the global as well as the euro-area 
financial system throughout 2009. However, the 
2010 sovereign debt crisis has caused renewed 
stress in the euro-area financial system and raised 
concerns about the robustness of its ongoing 
normalisation process. This section reviews 
channels through which the sovereign debt crisis 
of 2010 has impacted on financial activity and 
examines the implications for the recovery 
process in the euro-area financial sector. 
The public and the financial sector are 
interconnected through various channels. The 
most obvious one is that governments compete 
with financial intermediaries for the available 
pool of savings, the former for financing their 
debts and deficits, the latter for channelling funds 
to borrowers and investors. Since yields on 
government bonds are widely seen as the 
benchmark for prices of a range of private 
financial transactions, high public financing tend 
to raise yields across the board and have spurred a 
debate about possible crowding-out of private 
investment. Moreover, there have been concerns 
that banks could find it increasingly difficult to 
finance their activity in an environment of rising 
issuance of sovereign bonds, as they may have to 
compete with governments for funds.  
The sovereign debt crisis has also highlighted the 
relevance of further, less apparent, connections 
between the financial and the public sector. On 
the liability side, for example, several financial 
intermediaries faced higher funding costs on 
wholesale markets shortly after the sovereign debt 
of the country where they were headquartered was 
downgraded. The quasi-simultaneity of changes to 
sovereign and corporate ratings suggests that 
credit risk in the public and banking sector has 
become strongly interrelated. On the asset side, 
some government bonds are no longer regarded as 
quasi-riskless, prompting some investors to 
restructure their portfolios. This has led to lower 
government benchmark interest rates, with 
possible consequences for financial institutions in 
terms of interest revenues and appetite for risk.  
Spillover of credit risk from the public to the 
banking sector  
Throughout 2010, sovereign downgrades were 
often closely followed by downgrades of banks 
located in the same country. This coincidence 
may mean that the credit risk of the public sector 
sets a floor beneath the credit rating of financial 
institutions. In addition to changes by rating 
agencies, markets’ assessment of public and 
banks’ credit risk also points to possible spillovers 
from the public to the banking sector. These 
spillovers are evidenced in Graph II.2.1 by a 
strong co-movement of the CDS indices of the 
public and the banking sectors in the euro area. 
Most peaks of public CDS took place before the 
peaks of banks’ CDS and the correlation is 
highest if bank CDS lag sovereign CDS by one 
day, suggesting that in many cases the causality 
runs from the public to the banking sector.  
Graph II.2.1: Credit risk of the public and the 
banking sector as measured by CDS spreads of 
euro-denominated debt (in basis points) 
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Source: Ecowin, Commission services. 
There are at least two (not mutually exclusive) 
explanations for the close correlation between 
public and financial credit risk.  
The first explanation relates to the impact of 
higher risks attached to public debt on banks’ 
liquidity and solvency.  
• Liquidity is affected because government bonds 
are important vehicles for transactions on 
wholesale lending markets. They serve as 
collateral in banks’ repurchase operations with 
the ECB but also in private repo transactions and 
in trade with financial derivatives. Changes in 
haircuts (for example following the downgrade 
of Greek bonds in June 2010) or higher margin 
requirements (e.g. as enacted by the clearing 
house LCH Clearnet on Irish bonds) reduce the 
value of government bonds used as collateral to 
obtain refinancing for financial activity. In the 
worst case, a fall in sovereign bond values may 
force financial institutions with a limited pool of 
collateral to reduce business.  
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• Solvency may be affected because declines in 
government bonds’ market value affect banks’ 
trading books, reducing their profits and capital. 
The EU-wide stress tests coordinated by the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS) in summer 2010 show that this effect 
can sometimes be substantial and varies 
depending on the banks and countries 
considered. The stress tests covered a panel of 
91 banks of which 77 are headquartered in the 
euro area and assessed the impact of both a 
severe macroeconomic shock and a sovereign 
risk shock on banks’ Tier 1 capital ratio. (33) The 
results show that the sovereign debt shock would 
cause the Tier 1 ratio to decline on average in the 
euro area from 8.8 % to 8.1 % (non-weighted 
average) or from 9.0 % to 8.6 % (weighted 
average). Graph II.2.2 shows that the drop would 
be markedly higher for banks located in some 
countries with difficult public debt positions. 
This is indicative of banks holding a large share 
of domestic sovereign bonds, while their 
exposure to sovereign bonds from other Member 
States is on average more limited. Considerable 
differences exist, however, across banks. 
Graph II.2.2: Changes in the Tier 1 capital ratio 
of banks in response to a sovereign risk shock, 
CEBS stress tests (average per country, in pp of 
Tier 1 ratio) 
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Source: CEBS, Commission services. 
The second explanation for the strong 
interdependence between public and financial 
credit risks relates to the fact that the public sector 
has become the implicit or even explicit guarantor 
of banks’ solvency in many EU Member States. 
                                                        
(33) The sovereign risk shock was modelled as a common shift in 
the yield curve (125 bp for the three-month rates and 75 bp 
for the 10-year rates) supplemented with country-specific 
upward shocks to long-term government bond yields (overall 
amounting to 70 bp for the euro area). See http://stress-test.c-
ebs.org/documents/Summaryreport.pdf. 
The public measures enacted during the 2008/09 
banking crisis (extended guarantees, capital 
injections, asset purchases, etc.) mean that risks 
have partly been transferred from the financial to 
the public sector. However, there are signs that 
the value of public guarantees for the banking 
system has deteriorated over time. Graph II.2.3 
shows that spreads on state-guaranteed bonds 
increased considerably in early summer 2010. 
Since then, it has become more expensive to issue 
a bank bond with a state guarantee than a covered 
bond. (34) The difference between state-
guaranteed and covered bonds in the graph even 
underestimates the costs of issuing a guaranteed 
bond because, in addition to the coupon payable, 
the issuer has to pay a fee of 100-120 bp to the 
public sector as guarantor. Except in Spain and 
Greece, only few euro-area banks have resorted to 
the issuance of state-guaranteed bonds since May 
2010.  
Graph II.2.3: State-guaranteed bank bonds: 
volume outstanding and spread of euro-
denominated debt 
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Source: Ecowin, Commission services. 
Obviously, spillovers in credit risk do not only run 
from the public sector to banks. Ireland is a clear 
case of reverse causality, i.e. of sovereign risks 
increasing because problems in the banking sector 
were perceived to have intensified. In autumn 
2008, Ireland announced that it was in effect 
guaranteeing all deposits and debt of its banking 
system. In summer 2010, the rating agency 
Standard & Poors justified its downgrade of the 
Irish long-term sovereign credit rating with an 
upward revision of its estimate of the expected 
costs of financial sector support. Accordingly, 
market observers ascribed the rising spreads on 
Irish government bonds in autumn 2010 to the 
precarious situation of parts of its banking system. 
                                                        
(34) A covered bond is a bond that is backed by revenue streams 
from an underlying asset, such as a mortgage or a loan. 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area IV/2010 
 
- 26 -
Sovereign debt problems hampered banks’ 
access to finance in some Member States 
In the euro area as whole, tensions on government 
bond markets in 2010 have had a clear temporary 
impact on banks’ capacity to tap long-term debt 
markets. Graph II.2.4 illustrates that the spreads 
of bank bonds moderated gradually until spring 
2010, falling back to levels last seen in summer 
2008 prior to the huge spread increase following 
Lehman’s failure. In spring 2010, however, when 
the sovereign debt crisis intensified, banks’ costs 
of issuing long-term debt securities rose again. 
Banks’ issuance activity pre-Lehman’s was 
accompanied by a rise in spreads, but thereafter 
followed a broadly inverse trend, with net 
issuance turning positive only once spreads began 
falling. This inverted trend showed tentative signs 
of normalising again in August 2010.  
Graph II.2.4: Conditions in euro-denominated 
bank debt markets, euro area (1) 
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Source: Ecowin, Commission services. 
The impact of the sovereign debt crisis on money 
markets in the euro area as a whole remained 
short-lived and contained, largely thanks to ECB 
policy interventions that accommodated liquidity 
shortages. (35) Money market rates rose slightly 
between April and July 2010 and the 3-month 
Euribor-OIS spread, widely seen as the central 
gauge of counterparty risk on wholesale money 
markets, widened over the summer before falling 
back to a level slightly above its starting position.  
Nevertheless, while the aggregate impact on 
money market spreads in the euro area remained 
limited, developments in ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ 
Member States diverged. When public debt 
managers faced challenging conditions on 
                                                        
(35) See ‘Developments on financial markets in early May’, 
Box 3 in ECB Monthly Bulletin, June 2010. 
sovereign bond markets in some Member States, 
several banks located in these countries also 
encountered difficulties in accessing wholesale 
finance on money markets. As the ECB continued 
its full-allotment policy, these banks were able to 
substitute central bank funds for interbank funds. 
The fact that ECB lending channelled via the 
central banks of some Member States has 
remained at relatively high levels since is 
indicative of the depth of localised tensions on 
interbank markets linked to the sovereign debt 
crisis.  
Overall, the available data indicate that the 
spillover of credit risk to the banking system 
temporarily increased financing costs of financial 
liabilities, although this was fairly short-lived in 
the euro area as a whole. However, it has also led 
to new pockets of exposure. Banks located in 
countries most strongly hit by the turmoil on 
sovereign debt markets have faced credit rating 
downgrades and limited access to refinancing 
markets on a more permanent basis. To the extent 
that the sovereign debt crisis constrains public 
sector support for the banking system, banks in 
need of further public capital, guarantees or 
liquidity may see their business position 
weakened as long as public finances are under 
stress. Others may see both their credit risk and 
refinancing costs progressively decoupled from 
those of the home country’s public sector.  
The sovereign crisis has triggered substantial 
changes in portfolio composition  
The impact of the sovereign debt crisis on 
financial markets is not restricted to banks. 
Ensuing changes in risk assessment have also 
deeply altered the composition of investment 
portfolios. Since the beginning of the sovereign 
debt crisis, the value of some government bonds 
has become more volatile and investors 
increasingly perceive even investment in euro-
area government bonds as risky. Traditionally, 
fixed income investors are risk-averse, with a 
preference for long-term stability in the valuation 
of their portfolio. Some institutional investors face 
restrictions, either of a regulatory nature or from 
their customers, which limit their possibilities to 
take risks. For these investors, the reclassification 
of some government bonds as risky and volatile 
assets induced structural adjustments to their 
investment strategy.  
There is some support for the notion of a shift in 
the composition of sovereign bond portfolios 
away from ‘riskier’ government bonds to ones 
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that are still considered as risk-free. Market 
sources indicate that since the sovereign debt 
crisis, the role of US and German government 
bonds as major risk-free assets has been 
reinforced. This implies additional demand for 
these benchmark bonds and consequently lower 
benchmark yields. 
Graph II.2.5: Benchmark yield and the dispersion 
of sovereign spreads in the euro area (in %) 
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Source: Ecowin, Commission services. 
Evidence of a redirection of sovereign bond 
portfolios towards safer bonds can be derived 
from the dispersion of sovereign bond yields 
(Graph II.2.5). Those Member States perceived as 
having relatively higher sovereign risk have 
experienced a relative rise in their bond yields. 
Interestingly, this development contrasts with the 
pre-crisis period when, due to the ongoing ‘search 
for yield’, sovereign bonds in the euro-area 
periphery generally out-performed the average. In 
this period, a decline in the German Bund yield 
was typically accompanied by a narrowing of 
yield spreads. 
Market data indicate that trading in secondary 
markets for bonds of peripheral euro-area 
Member States slowed over the summer of 2010. 
During that period, when liquidity on bond 
markets is already traditionally low, the ECB 
under its Securities Market Programme was the 
main purchaser of the bonds concerned. (36) Low 
liquidity on markets implies that unexpected 
events may have a profound impact on market 
prices and spreads, exaggerating the effect of 
market news on changes in investor sentiment. 
Box II.2.1 presents estimations of the link 
                                                        
(36) The ECB decided in May 2010 that it would intervene in 
euro-area government bond markets (under the Securities 
Market Programme) in order to ‘ensure depth and liquidity in 
those market segments which were dysfunctional’, so as to 
restore an ‘appropriate monetary policy transmission 
mechanism’. 
between sovereign yields and liquidity that show 
that low levels of liquidity can push yields 
significantly upwards.  
The narrowing of the available pool of benchmark 
bonds has also made them more sensitive to 
changes in investors’ strategies. In August 2010, 
negative US economic indicators left investors 
scrambling to shift their portfolios from equities 
to risk-free bonds, which brought the German 
Bund yield down to its historically lowest level 
and the US Treasury close to the level recorded in 
January 2009, when a severe recession was 
expected.  
Lower benchmark interest rates may boost 
activity but complicate balance sheet repair in 
the financial sector  
Low benchmark interest rates have the potential to 
provide a positive impulse to economic activity in 
the euro area through higher asset prices and 
lower costs of debt servicing and investment. 
However, they may also weigh on banks’ 
profitability, particularly their interest margins.  
Graph II.2.6: Consensus real GDP forecast for 
2011, successive revisions during 2010  
(annual growth in %) 
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The positive effects depend on whether the low 
benchmark rate is not itself caused by the 
perception of weaker economic activity. This does 
not seem to be the case in the euro area. 
According to Graph II.2.6, growth forecasts for 
the euro area for 2011 hardly changed during the 
course of 2010, despite the sovereign crisis. If 
anything, market participants became slightly 
more optimistic regarding prospects in Germany.  
In some cases, a fall in benchmark interest rates 
may, however, have a depressing impact on 
banks’ profitability. For example, concerns have 
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been raised that a low level of interest rates in 
combination with low lending volumes could 
unduly compress some banks’ interest margins, 
thereby hindering their profitability and the 
recapitalisation of their balance sheets. Although 
net interest revenues are only one source of 
banks’ profits, they are an important one and 
during the financial crisis their share in total 
revenues grew relative to trading and fee income. 
German data presented in Graph II.2.7 show that 
banks’ interest rate margins tend to follow the 
development of the benchmark interest rate with a 
lag. Econometric estimations with German data 
suggest that the maximum negative impact of 
lower interest rates on banks’ interest revenues 
occurs after three to four years. (37) Thus, low 
interest rates are likely to weigh on banks’ profit 
margins over the medium term.  
Similarly, life insurance companies that, for 
instance, guarantee a 3 % per year return on the 
policy will find it difficult in times of low yields 
to assure this by investing in government or triple-
A bonds. The persistently low interest rates may 
                                                        
(37) To account for the interdependency of the variables, this was 
estimated with a vector autoregression, using interest 
revenues, nominal GDP and interest rates or the term 
structure. 
 
 
 Box II.2.1: The link between sovereign liquidity and spreads — Tentative empirical support
This box presents some tentative empirical support for the explanation that liquidity considerations interacted with 
spreads over summer 2010, using a simple cross-country OLS regression. Across euro-area Member States, changes 
in sovereign bond spreads and CDS spreads generally tend to be highly correlated and this is also true for the 
summer 2010 (see chart). A high correlation is not surprising because default risk is an important common factor for 
both variables. However, the decline in liquidity on some peripheral Member States’ sovereign bond markets should 
be expected to have a different effect on bonds and CDS spreads. Thus, one could expect that bond spreads of 
illiquid sovereigns would increase by more than predicted on the basis of the rise in CDS spreads. The higher the 
liquidity in a market segment, the smaller should be ceteris paribus the increase in spreads. This hypothesis was 
tested with daily data for 11 euro-area Member States (BE, DE, EL, ES, IE, FR, IT, NL AT, PT, SF) with period-
fixed effects FEt. Regressing the daily changes in bond spreads ∆Y over the period 1 June to 9 September 2010 on 
the daily changes in CDS spreads ∆CDS, daily changes in stock price indices ∆EQ and a measure of market size L 
gives:  
∆Yi. t = 0.01 + 0.24∆CDSi, t - 0.54 ∆EQi ,t -0.017 Li, t + FEt + єi, t 
s.e. 0.003 0.021 0.291 0.007  
Prob 0.005 0 0.065 0.019  
Standard errors in brackets, R2 = 0.42, DW= 1.83, N = 772  
 
Over this period, all variables in the estimated 
equation have the expected sign and are significant at 
the standard 5 % level or, in the case of stock 
prices, (1) close to being significant. The results 
suggest that the increase in default risk and decrease in 
stock prices, reflecting the expected impact of the 
business cycle, had a large impact on the variation of 
bond spreads during summer 2010. Higher liquidity 
was associated with lower spreads. The measure for L 
used was the market value of iBoxx benchmark 
portfolios for sovereign bonds (in EUR trillion). (2) 
This number is available at daily frequency, although 
it changes only once a month. Interestingly, L is not 
significant when the regression is run for other periods 
(starting 9/2009, 1/2010, 4/2010), suggesting that this 
factor has influenced intra-area bond spreads in the 
recent past, but is not a permanent determinant of 
spreads. Comparable results are found if the volatility of changes in yields is taken as a measure of liquidity rather 
than market size. The coefficient is higher and more significant the more closely the estimation period is narrowed 
to summer 2010, suggesting that liquidity effects have recently become a determinant of bond yields. 
                                                          
(1) This result is attributable to the use of period-fixed effects, which controls for factors that are common to all countries. When 
estimated without time-fixed effects, the change in stock prices is significant. 
(2) The series for EL was discontinued on 1 July 2010. The latest available value was used to fill observations after that date. 
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induce them to take additional risks to meet 
guaranteed return targets.  
Graph II.2.7: Interest rates and interest margins 
in the German banking system (in %) 
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Commission services. 
The situation for financial institutions and, in 
particular, banks in peripheral euro-area Member 
States may be somewhat different. While they 
may face higher refinancing costs, they may also 
have the opportunity to pass on the higher 
government bond interest rates in their home 
country to higher retail lending rates, thereby 
maintaining their interest margin and shifting the 
adjustment burden further to the real economy. 
Available evidence suggests, however, that there 
has been no systematic shift of the interest burden 
to banks' customers although banks in some 
Member States seem, to a certain extent, to have 
to been able to do so in some market segments 
Arguably, margin adjustment pressure will be 
stronger for banks that entered the sovereign crisis 
with low interest margins/revenues. Comparing 
2009 balance sheet data across banks, there is, 
however, no indication that interest margins were 
significantly lower in banks located in peripheral 
Member States relative to those in ‘core’ 
countries. Neither is there evidence that banks that 
have received State aid have systematically lower 
interest margins. While a lower interest rate can 
be expected to increase the adjustment burden on 
banks, the impact on different banking clusters’ 
profitability is ex ante difficult to derive. 
Banks may be able to nevertheless generate steady 
net interest revenues if economic activity is 
sufficiently strong. Thus, the importance of the 
ongoing economic recovery for banks’ 
profitability has increased since the sovereign 
debt crisis and the associated drop in benchmark 
interest rates. Whereas financial market 
participants initially focused on the sustainability 
of public debt, they later became worried about 
the consequences of austerity measures for 
economic growth once these were enacted. By 
end-November, broad stock market indices had 
recovered the losses incurred during the sovereign 
debt crisis, although still remaining below their 
pre-crisis peaks. However, shares in financial 
institutions underperformed the broad market 
index (Graph II.2.8). From their temporary low in 
late August 2010 to late November, they 
underperformed compared to the overall 
Eurostoxx index, implying that markets have 
turned more pessimistic regarding banks’ 
profitability than profitability in the economy as a 
whole.  
Graph II.2.8: Stock prices in the euro area  
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Lower benchmark interest rates may increase 
risk-taking but may help lower compound risk 
Low interest rates over an extended period of time 
may encourage risk-taking by the financial sector. 
Recent empirical studies by the IMF, BIS and 
ECB suggest that there has indeed been a link 
between low interest rates over an extended 
period and higher risk-taking in the past. (38)  
But at this stage there is little evidence of banks 
stepping up their risk-taking at the aggregate 
level. Despite favourable financing conditions, 
financial institutions are not raising as much 
                                                        
(38) For the so-called risk-taking channel of monetary policy 
transmission see:  
De Nicolò, G., G. Dell'Ariccia and L. Laeven (2010), 
'Monetary policy and bank risk taking', IMF Staff Notes, 
No 10/09;  
Altunbas, Y. L. Gambacorta and D. Marques-Ibanez (2010), 
‘Does monetary policy affect bank risk-taking?’, BIS 
Working Paper, No 298;  
Maddaloni, A. and J.L. Peydro (2010), ‘Bank risk-taking, 
securitisation and low interest rates, ECB Working Paper, 
No 1248. 
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funding on wholesale markets as they used to do 
in previous years. In their efforts to reduce their 
sensitivity to wholesale funding, banks report that 
they aim at replacing short-term wholesale 
funding with more stable deposits. On the asset 
side, credit standards are still tight, suggesting that 
banks have not moved towards more risky lending 
behaviour. Investments in those assets that went 
through a strong boom-bust cycle in recent years 
(for example securitised assets) are reportedly still 
at a low level. This also holds for investments in 
markets that are genuinely risky, but which were 
not at the centre of the financial crisis, such as 
private equity, hedge funds, etc. Financial 
institutions have used past profits to improve their 
capital buffers, thereby reducing leverage. 
Conclusions 
Investors’ worsening perception of sovereign risk 
has contributed to a negative loop between public 
finances and financial market developments. It 
has raised funding costs for banks in peripheral 
Member States and has complicated the  
ongoing process of balance sheet repair. The 
emergence of some sovereign bonds as risky 
assets has segmented the investor base and led to 
higher funding costs for some Member States, at a 
time of falling benchmark interest rates in the 
euro area. Lower benchmark rates may stimulate 
economic activity, but they may also reduce profit 
margins in the financial industry and encourage 
risk-taking. While this may run counter to the aim 
of minimising overall risk levels in the economy, 
there is currently little evidence of financial 
institutions increasing their risk positions or 
interrupting their deleveraging process. Overall, 
while risks have become less system-wide and 
more concentrated in individual Member States, 
the possibility of contagion across highly 
interconnected markets means that the EU 
financial system as a whole remains exposed. 
With the advent of the sovereign debt crisis, the 
prospects for recovery in the financial system 
have become even more dependent on the strength 
of the economic recovery than before. 
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II.3. Impact of the financial crisis on 
corporate finance: how big is the 
shift from bank financing to bonds? 
The global financial crisis had detrimental 
consequences for banks’ balance sheets, as well as 
for their funding costs and profitability, thus 
weighing negatively on their ability to supply new 
loans. As a result, banks tightened credit standards 
for all borrowers, including non-financial 
corporations. The restricted access to bank 
funding for the corporate sector induced the latter 
to seek other sources of external financing. The 
high level of euro-area corporate bond issuance in 
2009 suggests that European corporations were 
able to partly replace bank financing with 
corporate bond market financing and, in addition, 
to do so at a relatively low average cost.  
External financing of non-financial corporations 
has traditionally been more bank-based in the euro 
area than, for example, in the US, where the bulk 
of financing is done through the bond market. As 
a result of the financial crisis, euro-area firms —
particularly large ones — seem to have moved 
towards this hitherto under-utilised form of 
external financing. Their success in doing so may 
suggest that corporate financial structures in the 
euro area are adaptable. If this change proved 
durable it would imply a more complete financial 
structure in the euro area with the possibility for 
large firms to obtain external financing from 
market sources and a relative concentration of 
bank lending towards small and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
The financial crisis gave a boost to market 
financing 
Bank lending has traditionally been the most 
important source of external financing for non-
financial corporations in the euro area. From the 
start of the year 2000 to the second quarter of 
2007, bank loans accounted on average for around 
65 % of the total external financing of non-
financial corporations, while debt securities issued 
and net equity issued (netting equity issuance with 
the acquisition of equity) accounted for only 11 % 
and 0.5 % respectively.  
In comparison with the US, the role of market 
funding is small in the euro area. In 2007, the 
capitalisations of the euro-area’s equity and 
corporate bond markets stood at 85 % and 81 % of 
GDP respectively. At the same time, the 
respective US market capitalisations amounted to 
144 % and 168 % of GDP. 
In mid-2007, when the first signs of financial 
turbulence emerged, global credit conditions 
worsened substantially. The peak of the tightening 
of credit standards occurred in early 2009 and 
since then the rate of net tightening of credit 
standards has been on a declining trend, although 
banks have not yet started to ease their credit 
conditions (see Graph II.3.1). Whereas economic 
prospects have started to improve, net lending to 
non-financial corporations in the euro area 
remained in negative territory until the last quarter 
of 2010.  
Graph II.3.1: Credit standards and demand for 
loans by enterprises in the euro area (in %) (1) 
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(1) net % of banks reporting a tightening of standards or an 
improvement in demand. 
Source: ECB Bank Lending Survey. 
In this situation, several euro-area enterprises 
turned to the bond market in search of external 
financing. Graph II.3.2 shows that the issuance of 
bonds by the non-financial corporate sector in 
2009 reached a record high, at nearly twice the 
amount registered in 2008 (EUR 354bn and 
EUR 183bn respectively). This suggests that non-
financial corporations were able in 2009 to 
compensate partly for the loss of bank lending by 
increased bond issuance. Some research has also 
concluded that the substitution of debt securities 
for bank loans by non-financial corporations is 
indicative of binding bank loan supply constraints 
in the euro area. (39) 
In view of the fixed transaction costs involved 
when tapping market sources, the issuance of a 
bond requires a minimum amount to make 
economic sense. The possibility of seeking 
external financing is thus available mostly to large 
enterprises and does not apply to small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), whose 
financing remains mostly bank-based. The 
                                                        
(39) See IMF (2010), ‘Euro Area Policies: Selected Issues’, IMF 
Country Report, No 10/222. 
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redirection of big firms towards debt securities 
nevertheless also helped SMEs as it freed up some 
of the banks’ lending capacity, which may have 
been used to meet SMEs’ funding needs. 
Conversely, SMEs were hurt when bond markets 
dried up during the critical phase of the financial 
crisis in late 2008 and corporate issuers sought 
external financing from banks, thereby curtailing 
the pool available to SMEs. 
Graph II.3.2: Bank, bond and share financing, 
euro-area non-financial corporate sector  
(EUR billion) (1) 
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(1) 2010 covers data for the first 9 months. 
Source: ECB, Commission services. 
The increased issuance of corporate bonds did not 
have a discernible adverse impact on the costs of 
bond market financing. Firstly, corporate issuers 
benefited from the downward trend in government 
benchmark yields (typically the German Bund in 
the euro area) in 2009. Secondly, corporate 
spreads relative to the benchmark declined 
strongly, leading to a marked decline in yields, in 
particular for lower-rated bonds such as BBB. 
From above 400 bp at the peak of the financial 
crisis in late 2008, spreads on corporate BBB 
bonds fell to below 150 bp in late 2009. In all 
rating categories for which benchmark time series 
are available, yields on corporate bonds declined 
to a lower level in 2009 than recorded before the 
start of the subprime crisis in 2007 (Graph II.3.3). 
Thus, declining risk premia in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis clearly over-compensated the 
possible impact of higher bond supply on funding 
costs. (40)  
Some incentives for increased issuance activity 
are likely to persist. A number of non-financial 
                                                        
(40) Corporate spreads remain, however, higher than before the 
financial crisis. 
corporations issued euro-denominated bonds for 
the first time in 2009. As issuance involves some 
entry costs (e.g. to build up an investor base), 
corporations that have issued once become more 
likely to issue in the future. Therefore, it is 
probable that the financial crisis has had a lasting 
favourable impact on corporate bond issuance by 
increasing the constituency of corporate issuers 
and thereby broadening the possible sources of 
financing for large companies. 
Graph II.3.3: Yields on corporate bonds  
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Graph II.3.4: Rating structure of bond issuance, 
euro-area non-financial corporations  
(in % of total issuance) (1) 
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(1) 2010 covers data for the first 9 months. 
Source: Commission services. 
The surge in issuance did not adversely affect the 
average credit quality of corporate issuance. The 
share of issues with a rating of at least BBB 
remained broadly constant in 2009 (Graph II.3.4). 
Although the amount of non-rated issues rose 
significantly in 2010, most of them came from 
large firms with an established brand name. It was 
also reported that a few established corporate 
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issuers ceased to use credit ratings when issuing 
bonds. Some market observers therefore claim 
that credit quality was better than the average 
rating would suggest.  
As regards the characteristics of the issuances, 
there has been a visible shift towards longer 
maturities over the last three years (see 
Graph II.3.5). Thus firms do not seem to have 
used bond issuances primarily to plug short-term 
funding gaps.  
Graph II.3.5: Maturity structure of bond 
issuance, euro-area non-financial corporations 
(in % of total issuance) (1) 
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Source: Commission services. 
With respect to the geographic distribution of 
issuers, three Member States (FR, DE, NL) 
account for a combined share of 50 % of euro-
denominated long-term corporate bonds. (41) The 
share of German, French and Italian firms 
increased at the expense of Dutch and US 
corporations in 2009, and further in 2010. The 
market share of issuers from the ‘peripheral’ euro-
area Member States (EL, ES, IE, PT) remained 
broadly constant until 2010. 
Share of corporate bond finance remains high 
in 2010 despite declining issuance 
Issuance activity has slowed down on the euro 
corporate bond market in 2010. The amount 
issued over the first nine months is broadly 
comparable to the average level reached over the 
same period in 2006-08, suggesting that 2009 may 
have been a special year, driven by special factors 
such as an uncertain business cycle outlook and a 
high risk of credit constraints. Thus, 
developments in 2010 may represent a return to 
                                                        
(41) Long-term means with a maturity of more than 1 year. 
more normal conditions. However, despite the fall 
in absolute issuance levels, the share of corporate 
bonds in firms’ external financing has remained 
high in 2010. The issuance of quoted shares has 
also weakened, while bank lending is still far 
below pre-crisis levels. 
The cost of borrowing cannot be the reason for the 
decline in euro-area issuance of corporate bonds 
this year compared with 2009. Despite an increase 
in the spread of corporate bonds, further falls in 
the benchmark interest rate on government debt 
pushed the yield on corporate debt to very low 
levels, with the coupon paid by the average 
corporation coming close to the lowest level in 
20 years.  
The crowding-out of private sector issuance by 
the substantial increase in public sector issuance 
does not seem to be the main reason for the 
decline of corporate bond issuance either. Yields 
rose in response to increased issuance, mainly by 
central governments, but there were no indications 
of supply constraints. Between the second quarter 
of 2009 and the third quarter of 2010, there was a 
positive correlation between the net issuance of 
corporate and government bonds (Graph II.2.6), 
whereas crowding-out should result in a negative 
correlation. Notwithstanding the issue of 
crowding-out, the sovereign debt crisis may have 
weakened issuance activity on private and public 
bond markets alike as suggested by the fall in 
issuance on both sovereign and corporate markets 
visible in Graph II.2.6 in 2010Q2 and 2010Q3. 
Graph II.3.6: Net issuances of public and 
corporate bonds, euro area (in billion EUR) 
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The economic upswing could be a reason for 
lower issuance activity. A rebound in economic 
activity normally increases earnings and provides 
liquidity for firms in the form of internal funding. 
There may also be a lower need for external 
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funding at the early phase of an economic 
upswing, when firms react to higher demand by 
increasing capacity utilisation, rather than by 
stepping up capacity through higher investment in 
physical capital. Such a hypothesis of lower 
external financing needs of the corporate sector is 
also supported by the belated recovery in 
investment growth (42) and by financial accounts 
data, which show that non-financial corporations 
have raised their holdings of liquid financial 
assets. In the second quarter of 2010, the 
combined holdings of deposits, short-term loans 
and short-term debt securities by non-financial 
corporations amounted to 38.3 % of GDP, up 3 pp 
over the same quarter a year earlier (Graph II.3.7). 
In particular, the share of loans extended by non-
financial corporations increased, suggesting that 
intra-firm loans have become an increasingly 
important means of financing. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that euro-area companies are endowed 
with relatively high cash reserves also due to the 
high corporate bond issuance last year. Finally, 
further support for the hypothesis of lower 
external funding needs comes from the spike of 
buy-back operations by European corporations. 
The number of buy-backs has risen from ten in the 
whole of 2009 to twenty-one in the current year to 
November 2010. 
Graph II.3.7: Liquid asset holdings of non-
financial corporations (% of GDP) 
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(42) Quarterly investment growth in the euro area was negative 
until early 2010 and only became positive in the second 
quarter this year. 
Finally, there are widespread expectations that 
interest rates could remain low for some time. 
Overall, the slowdown of corporate bond issuance 
in 2010 probably reflects a range of factors, 
among which high liquid asset positions in 
European corporations — that funded 
aggressively last year — and expectations of low 
interest rates play an important role.  
Conclusions 
It is too early to conclude whether a durable 
structural shift from bank to bond financing has 
taken place in the euro-area corporate sector. 
Nevertheless, the surge in bond issuance by non-
financial corporations in 2009 and the persistently 
high share of bonds in corporations’ external 
funding in 2010 suggest that part of the euro-area 
corporate sector may have responded to tightened 
bank credit conditions by looking for other 
sources of external funding. If persistent, this 
diversification in the use of financing sources 
would make part of the euro-area corporate sector 
— mostly large companies — less reliant on 
banks and possibly less vulnerable to adverse 
developments in this sector. 
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